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Abstract
This paper investigates the effect of a generous demogrant for the elderly that started in 2001
in Mexico City on the labor supply and time use of the elderly and of non-elderly family members
who live with them. Using data for the period 2000-2004 and a triple differences approach, I ￿nd
that prime-age women reduce both their housework and market work time signi￿cantly, but only
if they live with an age-qualifying woman in a poor neighborhood after the program started. In
contrast, the program seems to have no signi￿cant effect on the time use of prime-age men. My
results suggest that some of the public resources devoted to the elderly could actually spill over
to other age groups, especially in countries where extended families are common, and that the
gender of the potential bene￿ciary matters for outcomes.
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11 Introduction
This paper investigates the effect of a generous demogrant for the elderly that started in 2001 in
Mexico City, on the labor supply and time use of the elderly and of non-elderly family members who
live with them. Mexico, like other developing countries, is experiencing an accelerated trend towards
aging, which raises the need to allocate more resources to the elderly by implementing or broadening
the public programs for them in a sustainable way. In this context, investigating the effect of income
support programs for the elderly on the behavior of individuals and households affected by them is
relevanttoassesstheireffectivenessandtogetanestimateoftheextenttowhichresourcesallocatedto
a speci￿c demographic group reach individuals not originally targeted by public programs, especially
in countries where extended families are common.
PreviousstudiesonthelaborsupplyofolderworkersintheU.S.examinetheeffectofdifferent
features of the Social Security program, like the earnings test, on work participation and hours of
work , because Social Security bene￿ts are the most important source of income for the elderly in
that country (Friedberg, 2000;Gruber and Orszag, 2003)1. The Mexican transfer program studied in
this paper differs substantially from Social Security. ￿Pension Alimentaria para Adultos Mayores￿
(Nutrition transfer for senior adults) pays a monthly transfer of about 70 dollars to individuals age
70 or older who live in the part of Mexico City that belongs to the state of Distrito Federal. The
monthly transfer from the program is relatively large and it is not means-tested, not taxable and does
not depend on the individual’s earnings or previous contributions. In fact, the transfer is conditioned
exclusively on age, so it is not correlated with individual current or past labor and saving decisions,
1For a general survey on the effects of Social Security provisions on the labor supply of older workers, see Hurd
(1997). Leonesio (1990) surveys the literature on the effects of the earnings tests on labor supply of older workers in the
U.S. Evidence for other countries can be found in Baker and Benjamin (1999) for Canada, and Disney and Tanner (2000)
for the UK. Evidence on the effect of other Social Security rules on the decision of retiring vs. working around the world
can be found in Gruber and Wise (2005).
2or with unobservable individual or household characteristics affecting time use.
Asmentionedbefore, thetransfermightalsoaffectthetimeuseofnon-elderlyindividualswho
live with potential bene￿ciaries. Bertrand et al (2003) estimate the effect of a large and unexpected
rise in the pensions paid to poor elderly households in South Africa on the labor supply of working-
age household members. Using a cross section dataset collected after the policy change, they ￿nd a
large drop in labor supply for prime-age males and no signi￿cant effect for prime-age women2. In
this paper, I look at the effect of the Mexican demogrant on the labor supply of prime-age individuals,
but also on the time devoted to housework and leisure. Another difference with Bertrand et al (2003)
is that I also estimate the effect of the transfer program on the time use of individuals 60 to 69 years
old, who expect to receive the transfer in a few years, and on the time use of individuals age 70 or
older, who are directly targeted by the program.
More generally, this paper also contributes to the extense literature on the effect of transfer
programs on the labor supply of bene￿ciaries3. A major concern with transfer programs is that indi-
viduals can alter their labor behavior in order to preserve or qualify for higher bene￿ts. The reduction
of bene￿ts with other sources of income typically implies large marginal tax rates on earnings that
discourage work. In the program considered in this paper, the effect most likely comes from an
exogenous increase in the non-labor income of the household, and not from implicit tax rates.
I use panel data from the Mexican Urban Employment Survey (ENEU) for the period 2000-
2004 and a triple differences approach. My identi￿cation strategy exploits the fact that the metropol-
itan area of Mexico City has neighborhoods that belong to the state of Distrito Federal and also
neighborhoods that belong to State of Mexico. Individuals in elderly households in Distrito Fed-
2Using similar data, Jensen (2003) estimates the effect of the same pension increase in South Africa on private trans-
fers, but provides some evidence of no effect on migration, labor supply or household structure. Case and Deaton (1998)
estimate the effect of this pension increase in South Africa on other outcomes, like consumption, schooling and savings.
3Mof￿t (2002) reviews the economic research on this topic.
3eral were affected by the program after 2001, whereas individuals in elderly households in State of
Mexico were not. I also include individuals in non-elderly households both in Distrito Federal and
State of Mexico as additional controls. In my estimations, I also take into account that when the
program started in 2001, participation was restricted to elderly individuals in poor neighborhoods,
regardless of household income level, but was extended to all Distrito Federal residents who meet the
age requirement at the end of 2003.
My results suggest that some of the public resources devoted to the elderly could actually
spill over to other age groups and that the gender of the potential bene￿ciary matters for outcomes.
I ￿nd that prime-age women reduce both their housework and market work time signi￿cantly, but
only if they live with an age-qualifying woman in a poor neighborhood in Distrito Federal after the
program started. Simple calculations of the earnings foregone by these women show that at least
76% of the transfer from the program is being shared with them. In contrast, the program seems to
have no signi￿cant effect on the time use of prime-age men, regardless of the gender of the potential
recipient they live with. Individuals 60 to 69 years old do not change their time use unless they
actually live with a potential bene￿ciary, so the mere expectation of receiving the program in a few
years has not changed the labor supply of these individuals, at least in the early years of the program.
However, women 60 to 69 years old living with a potential bene￿ciary and similar men living in poor
neighborhoods in Distrito Federal signi￿cantly reduce their labor market participation and hours after
the program started. Individuals age 70 or older in Distrito Federal, who are directly targeted by
the program, change their time use only if they live with an additional person who quali￿es for the
program. In particular, they reduce their time devoted to housework, but I ￿nd no signi￿cant evidence
that the program has allowed them to increase their leisure time, probably because they are already
consuming more leisure than individuals in other age groups.
4According to my ￿ndings, the distributional effects of transfer programs for the elderly could
be lessened by the response of families affected by them. For instance, if prime-age women living
with an elderly woman in poor neighborhoods sign￿cantly reduce their labor suppply, the decrease
in their earnings could reduce the effectiveness of the program in increasing the total income of these
extended households. A second concern with this result would be the loss of labor market experience
suffered by these working-age women, which might result in lower earnings in the future. Another
implication of my results is that if the program were extended to the national level the decrease in the
labor supply of individuals 60 to 69 years old who live with a potential bene￿ciary could con￿ict with
the efforts made on other grounds, particularly pension system reform, to increase the labor supply
of people in their 60s. However, given that the transfer considered in this paper is not reduced with
income from other sources by design, it might be the less distortive way of transferring resources to
the elderly.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes and provides a brief history of the
program. Section 3 describes the data and identi￿cation strategy used in this paper and provides some
descriptive statistics. Section 4 presents and discusses the results for men and women in different age
groups. Section 5 concludes.
2 Description of the Program: "Nutrition Transfer for Senior
Adults"
￿Pension Alimentaria para Adultos Mayores￿ (Nutrition transfer for senior adults) is a transfer pro-
gram for individuals at least 70 years old who live in the part of the metropolitan area of Mexico
City that belongs to the state of Distrito Federal (DF). The monthly transfer is about 70 U. S. dollars
5per qualifying individual with no limit on the transfer amount that a household can receive from the
program4. The transfer can be accumulated every month and it is not means-tested, not taxable and
does not depend on previous contributions to the social security system or on any requirement other
than age. As a consequence, elegibility for the program is not correlated with past or current labor
and saving decisions, or with unobservable factors that affect individual or household income. The
program also provides free prescription drugs and free health care to bene￿ciaries in the hospitals
administered by the DF state government.
The program was ￿rst announced in January 2001. Due to a limited budget, only relatively
poor neighborhoods in DF participated in the ￿rst stage of the program. For implementation purposes,
the state government classi￿ed neighborhoods in DF as poor if they had very high, high or medium
poverty levels, according to an urban poverty index calculated by the National Population Council
(Conapo)5. Social workers from the state government made door-to-door visits in these neighbor-
hoods, and enrolled age-qualifying adults regardless of their household or individual income levels.
Payment of transfers to approximately 150, 000 bene￿ciaries started in March 2001. During the year,
new enrollment applications were accepted and the number of bene￿ciaries increased to 250, 000,
according to the state government’s annual report for that year.6 In September 2002, the local gov-
ernment announced a law proposal that would make the program permanent and extend the transfer
to all individuals at least 70 years old in DF. By the end of 2002, the program covered almost all of
the eligible population in poor areas.7 At the end of 2003, the law was approved and the program was
4Bene￿ciaries are given a debit card that can be used at a number of authorized grocery stores and produce markets
with no restriction on the kind of goods that can be purchased. Recently, the local goverment also authorized bene￿ciaries
to use the card to pay for utilities if they want to.
5This poverty index uses data from the 2000 Mexican Census, and it is a weighted combination of several indicators
at the neighborhood level, such as fraction of individuals without access to health services, infant mortality, fraction of
households without water or drainage, fraction of working individuals with earnings less than 2 times the minimum wage,
among others.
6Informe de Trabajo 2001, Secretaria de Salud del Distrito Federal (2001 Mexico City’s Health Department Report).
7Informe de Trabajo 2003, Secretaria de Salud del Distrito Federal (2003 Mexico City’s Health Department Report).
6extended to all individuals at least 70 years old with a minimum residence of 3 years in the DF part
of Mexico City, regardless of their individual or household income level and the neighborhood they
live in.
3 Data and Identi￿cation Strategy
This paper uses quarterly data from the Mexican Urban Employment Survey (ENEU), which is a
national rotating panel of urban households that has information on the time devoted to housework
and market work during the previous week. I use a sample of individuals at least 18 years old who live
inthemetropolitanareaofMexicoCityfortheperiodbetweenthesecondquarterof2000andthethird
quarter of 2004. Thus, my data covers the period before the start of the program, the initial stage of the
program when only poor neighborhoods in DF participated, and the periods after the announcement
and the implementation of the extension of the program to all age-qualifying DF residents.
As shown in Figure1, the metropolitan area of Mexico City is composed by neighborhoods
that belong to DF, and also by neighborhoods that have been incorporated into the city, but formally
belong to the State of Mexico and are under a separate political administration. Only individuals who
are at least 70 years old and live in DF are eligible for the demogrant, while their counterparts in State
of Mexico are not. My identi￿cation strategy uses the individuals in households with at least one
member who is 70 or more years old in State of Mexico, but still within the metro area of the city,
as controls for individuals in similar households in DF, which were affected by the program. I also
include individuals in households with no members with 70 or more years of age both in DF and in
State of Mexico, to control for any underlying economic conditions affecting individuals and families
in DF and State of Mexico that have nothing to do with the program.
7I estimate the effect of the program on the participation and weekly hours devoted to house-
work, market work and leisure for men and women in three age groups: 18 to 59 years old, 60 to 69
years old and at least 70 years old. Individuals in the ￿rst two age group are not directly targeted by
program, but they could change their time use due to the increase in household income induced by
the program. Individuals 60 to 69 years old expect to receive the transfer soon, so they could change
their time use even if they do not live with a potential bene￿ciary already.
To identify the neighborhoods that were classi￿ed as "poor" by the DF administration and
thus, participated form the initial stage of the program, I match the ENEU data with the neighborhood
level urban poverty index calculated by the National Population Council (Conapo)8. So, in this paper I
de￿ne an individual to be poor if she lives in a neighborhood with very high, high and medium poverty
level, regardless of her individual or household income level or the characteristics of her dwelling. By
doing this, I am able to distinguish the effect for individuals in poor neighborhoods, which might be
different due to timing of elegibility but also because for them the transfer might represent a higher
fraction of household and individual income.
For men and women 18 to 59 years old, I estimate the effect of the program with the triple in-
teraction of a dummy variable that indicates the presence of an individual who is at least 70 years old
in the household with a dummy for residing in DF and dummies for the period after 2001, when
the program ￿rst started in poor neighborhoods; after 2002, when the goverment announced the
law proposal that would make the program permanent and extend it to all DF residents; and after
2003, when this law was actually approved and implemented (for example, individual 70+ in the
household￿DF￿after2001): To estimate the effect of the gender of the potential bene￿ciary on time
8Both the ENEU data and the Conapo Poverty Index can be matched at the census track level, which is really what I
call "neighborhood" in this paper. The census track was also the unit at which the treatment was implemented by the DF
goverment.
8use, I include similar interactions of a dummy for having a woman who is at least 70 years old in the
household, residing in DF after 2001, 2002 and 2003 (woman 70+ in the household￿DF￿after2001).
Finally, I estimate the effect of the program for individuals who live with an age-qualifying individual
in poor neighborhoods, which participated in the program from the beginning by adding a dummy for
poor neighborhood to the interactions (poor￿individual 70+ in the household￿DF￿after2001 and
poor￿woman 70+ in the household￿DF￿after2001).
Men and women 60 to 69 years old expect to receive the transfer from the program rela-
tively soon, so for them I separately estimate the effect of residing in DF after the program started
(DF￿after2001) and the effect of living with an age-qualifying individual after the program started.
In addition, in my data the vast majority of individuals 60 to 69 years old who live with someone who
is at least 70 years old, live with an individual of opposite sex. As a consequence, I cannot estimate
the effect of having a potential bene￿ciary separately from the effect of having a female potential
bene￿ciary.
For individuals age 70 or older, I estimate the effect of being eligible for the program as
living in DF after the program started (DF￿after2001) and also the effect of having an additional
qualifying adult in the household (another individual 70+ in the household￿DF￿after2001), which
would capture the effect of an additional increase in household income due to the program.. As with
the 60 to 69 years old group, I cannot separately estimate the effect of living with another woman age
70 or older.
For all age groups, I estimate the effect on participation in housework and marjet work with
a probit model and the effect on housework, market work and leisure hours with a regression. I
clusterthestandarderrorsattheneighborhoodlevelassuggestedbyBertrand, Du￿oandMullainathan
(2004). In all estimations, I control for age, years of education, dummies for DF resident, year
9dummies, a dummy for married, poor, for having an individual age 70 or older in the household, for
having a woman 70 or older in the household and all the relevant double and triple interactions.
The top panel of Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the estimation
before the program started for individuals in households with at least one person with 70 or more
years of age, and individuals with no individuals 70 or more years of age in the household, both in
DF and State of Mexico. In general, individuals in elderly households are older, less educated, more
likely to be female and less likely to be married than individuals in non-elderly households. For both
groups, individuals in DF households are older and have more years of education than individuals
in similar households in State of Mexico. Most of the differences in means for the individuals in
comparable households in DF and State of Mexico are statistically signi￿cant, but not very large.
The bottom panel of Table 1 shows that households in DF have less members than households in
State of Mexico. Non elderly households in both states have more adults 18 to 59 years old than
non-elderly households, but less adults 60 to 69 years old. Most of the differences in means for
households are signi￿cant between DF and State of Mexico but the magnitude of the differences is
small. For elderly households, the number of total household members at least 70 years old, and the
number of men and women at least 70 years old are not signi￿cant between households in DF and
State of Mexico. On average, elderly households in DF have 1.19 elderly members and households
in State of Mexico have 1.17 elderly members. Elderly households in both states have more women
older than 70 than men, due to the greater longevity of women. The only striking difference between
states is the fraction of households in poor neighborhoods. In DF, 37.8 percent of elderly households
are in poor neighborhoods compared to 68.3 percent of similar households in State of Mexico; and
53.2 percent of non-elderly households in DF are in poor neighborhoods compared to 72.2 percent
of similar households in State of Mexico. To account for this difference, in my estimations I control
10for the effect of individual and household characteristics, for state and, in particular, for residing in a
neighborhood classi￿ed as poor, as mentioned before.
Table 2 shows the mean participation and hours devoted to housework, market work and
leisure for men and women in the different age groups considered in the analysis. For both men
and women, work participation and hours decrease with age as would be expected. For men, house-
work hours time increases with age, whereas for women it decreases only after age 70. In general,
women devote much more time to housework and less time to market work than men. About 97
percent of women 18 to 59 years old report doing some housework compared with only 67 percent of
men in the same age group. Women 18 to 59 and 60 to 69 years old spend on average 33 hours per
week doing housework, whereas for men housework hours never exceed 10 hours per week. Women
18 to 59 years old have a 42 percent labor force participation rate and 16 average working hours per
week, whereas men in the same age group have a labor force participation rate of 82 percent and 39
mean hours of work per week. Only 7 percent of women older than 70 participate in the labor force
and they work an average of 2 hours per week. In contrast, 23 percent of men older than 70 still work
and they devote 9 hours per week to work on average. In general, men have slighlty more leisure
hours per week than women in the same age group, but the differences are not large. As would be
expected, both men and women older than 70 have the highest leisure hours.
4 Results
4.1 Results for working-age individuals
The left panel of Table 3 shows that for women 18 to 59 years old who live with an age-qualifying in-
dividual in DF after the program started few of the estimated effects are signi￿cant, probably because
11the program affected all age-qualifying city residents only after 2003. In fact, the only signi￿cant
effects for these women are a decrease of 96 percentage points in housework participation after 2003
and an increase of 1.5 percentage points if they live with an elderly woman, and a decrease of 15
leisure hours per week for women who live with an elderly woman after 2003, signi￿cant only at
10%. In contrast, women 18 to 59 years old in poor neighborhoods in DF, which participated in the
program from the beginning, signi￿cantly increase their housework participation by 1.5 percentage
points if they live with an age-qualifying individual after 2001, 2002 and 2003, but they signi￿cantly
reduce this participation by 98 percentage points if they live with an age-qualifying woman. For
women in poor neighborhoods in DF, living with an individual age 70 or older has a negative effect
on housework hours and living with a woman age 70 or older has a positive effect, but none of these
effects is signi￿cant. Women 18 to 59 in poor households increase their work participation and hours
if they live with an elderly individual after the program started, although not signi￿cantly. In contrast,
they decrease work participation and hours if they live with an elderly woman and only the effects on
work hours are signi￿cant. These women decrease work hours by roughly 7.7 hours per week after
2001, when the program ￿rst started, by 7.6 hours per week after 2002 and by 10.6 hours per week
after 2003, when the program became permanent. Prime-age women living with an elderly woman in
poor neighborhoods increase their leisure hours after the program started, which is consistent with the
observed reduction in their time devoted to both housework and market work, but the only signi￿cant
effect on leisure is an increase of 22.1 hours per week after 2003.
The right panel of Table 3 shows that men 18 to 59 years old living with an individual age
70 or older in DF decrease their housework participation and hours after the program, but the only
signi￿cant effects are the decrease of 33 percentage points in housework participation after 2001; and
for housework hours, the decrease of 3.3 hours after 2001 and of 5.8 hours after 2002. In contrast,
12living with a woman age 70 or older has a positive effect on housework participation and hours, but
only the increase of 23.6 percentage points in participation after 2001 is signi￿cant at 5%, and the
increase of 7.5 hours after 2002 and of 4.3 hours after 2003 are signi￿cant at 10%. Living with an
elderly woman after the program started has negative effects on work participation and hours for men
in DF, both in poor and non-poor neighborhoods, but none of these effects is signi￿cant. Most of the
other estimated effects for men in this age group are small and not signi￿cant at conventional levels.
In addition, some of the effects change signs from year to year, which.suggests that, except for the
effects on housework, the program had no signi￿cant effect on the time use of men 18 to 59 years
old who live with a potential bene￿ciary in DF, not even for those living in poor neighborhoods. This
result differs from Bertrand et al (2003), who ￿nd that in South Africa prime-age males experience
the largest reduction in labor supply as a result of a substantial pension increase. This contradicting
result could be due to the cultural differences in the attitude towards market work between urban
Mexico and South Africa. Bertrand et al (2003) note the low employment rate for prime-age males
in their data.(0.26). In contrast, prime-age males have the highest labor force participation rate (0.88)
and average market work hours per week in my data (see Table 2). In addition, anecdotal evidence
suggests that in urban Mexico, prime-age men are expected to work outside the house and not doing
so is socially frowned upon. Given this, it is not surprising that even men living with a potential
bene￿ciary do not change their time use signi￿cantly, in particular their time devoted to market work,
after the program started.
To get a rough estimate of how much of the transfer from the program is shared with prime-
age women, I do a back-of the-envelope calculation of the earnings foregone by them. I calculate
the mean hourly wage for women 18 to 59 years old with my data and multiply this mean wage by
the average effect on hours obtained from my estimations. For instance, the mean hourly wage for
13women 18 to 59 years old who live in a poor neighborhood in DF is $1.76 USD and on average
women in these neighborhoods who live with an age qualifying woman decrease their hours of work
by 7.6 to 10.6 hours per week after 2002 and 2003, so the earnings foregone by these women range
from $53.5USD per month after 2002 (1.76￿7:6￿4) and to $74.6 USD (1.76￿10:6￿4) after 2003.
Considering that the individual transfer from the program is approximately $70USD per month, this
simple calculation suggests that at least 76% of the transfer is being shared with prime-age women,
which would also suggest that household income is not increasing by the full amount of the transfer.
4.2 Results for individuals 60 to 69 years old
Table 4 shows that for women 60 to 69 years old none of the effects of living in DF after the program
started is signi￿cant, not even for those living in poor neighborhoods in DF, suggesting that the ex-
pectation of receiving the program soon does not affect the time use of women in this age group. In
contrast, for both women in DF and women in poor neighborhoods in DF, the program seems to have
affected their time use only if they live with a potential bene￿ciary and most of the signi￿cant effects
are observed after 2002, after the extension and permanence of the program was announced. For all
women in DF who live with an individual age 70 or older the program increase their participation in
housework by about 8 percentage points after 2002 and 2003, and housework hours by 17 to 19 hours
per week after those years. These women decrease their labor force participation by 30 to 35 percent-
age points, and their work hours by 18 to 25 hours per week, but these effects on hours of work are
not signi￿cant. For women 60 to 69 years old in poor neighborhoods in DF, living with an individual
at least 70 years old sign￿cantly decreases housework participation and hours, and surprisingly, in-
creases work participation and hours. All these effects are particularly large after 2002. Housework
participacion decreases by 94 points after 2002 and 2003 and housework hours decrease by about 20
14hours per week after those years as a result of the program. Labor force participation for these women
increases by about 70 percentage points after and work hours increase after 56 to 62 hours per week
after 2002 and 2003, and so leisure weekly hours decrease by 36 to 41 hours, but only the last effect
is sign￿cant at 10%. This increase in work participation and hours of women living with a qualifying
individual in poor neighborhoods is large, especially considering the mean participation and hours for
women in this age group. Most of these women live with a man at least 70 years old, as I mentioned
before. For women 18 to 59 in poor neighborhoods, living with a man age 70 or older increases labor
force participation and hours, even though these effects are mostly not signi￿cant (see Table 3). Even
though for women 60 to 69 years old in poor neighborhoods I do not have the gender variation to
estimate the effect of living with an age-qualifying man versus a woman, it might be that part of this
large increase in the time devoted to work is due to living with a man who quali￿es for the program.
The right panel of Table 4 shows that men 60 to 69 years old in DF do not change their time
use because they expect to receive the program in a few years. All the effects of living in DF after
the program started, even for men in poor neighborhoods, are small and not signi￿cant, except for
an increase in 2 housework per week after 2002 and 2003, signi￿cant only at 10%. Men living with
an individual age 70 or older in DF decrease their housework time, and increase their working time,
and these effects are large and signi￿cant only after 2002, when the announcement of the program
extension was made. For these men, housework participation declines by 95 percentage points and
housework hours fall by about 14 hours per week after 2002 and 2003. In contrast, their labor force
participation by 53 to 73 percentage points and hours of work by 18 to 24 after those years, but only
the effect after 2003 is sign￿cant at 10%. Leisure hours decrease for these men after 2002 and 2003,
but none of these effects is signi￿cant. For men 60 to 69 years old in poor neighborhoods in DF,
living with an age-qualifying individual increases their time devoted to housework, decreases their
15time devoted to market work and increases their leisure time. Most of these effects are signi￿cant
only after 2002 even though poor neighborhoods participated in the program since 2001. These men
increase their housework participation by 7.3 percentage points and housework hours by 21 to 23
hours per week after 2002 and 2003, and they sharply decrease their work participation by 28 to 33
percentage points and work hours by 53 to 58 hours per week after those years, which contrasts with
the results obtained for poor women in the same age group. Leisure time increases by 16 hours after
2001, but this effect is not signi￿cant, and by about 35 hours after 2002 and 2003.
4.3 Results for individuals at least 70 years old
Table 5 shows the results for individuals at least 70 years old in DF, who are the direct bene￿ciaries
of the program. For both men and women age 70 or older most of the effects of being eligible for
the program are not signi￿cant at conventional levels, not even for those in poor neighborhoods, only
some of the effects of having an additional eligible person in the household.
For women in DF, having another potential bene￿ciary in the household decreases housework
participation by about 96 percentage points after 2002 and 2003; and it decreases labor force partic-
ipation by about 8 percentage points. Work hours also decrease, but only the drecrease of 6,6 hours
after 2002 is signi￿cant at 5%. For these women, no effect on leisure time is signi￿cant. Poor eligible
women who live with another potential bene￿ciary reduce their housework participation by 95 per-
centage points after 2001, when the program ￿rst started, and signi￿cantly reduce housework hours
by 10 to 16 hours per week. Together with this reduction in housework time, poor eligible women
who live with another qualifying individual increase their labor force participation by 97 percentage
points in all years after the program started and only the increase of 12.4 hours in their weekly hours
of work after 2003 is signi￿cant at 10%. Despite this increase in time devoted to market work, column
165 of Table 5 shows that the estimated effects on leisure are all positive, but not signi￿cant for poor
elderly women who live with an additional potential bene￿ciary.
For men at least 70 years old, the only signi￿cant effects are the decrease of 2 to 3 weekly
housework hours experienced by men who live with an additional qualifying individual in poor neigh-
borhoods and the decrease of 19 percentage points in their labor force participation after 2002.
5 Conclusions
This paper estimates the effect of a recent demogrant for individuals age 70 or older who live in
Mexico City on the time use of eligible individuals and of non-elderly family members who live with
them. As the amount of public resources allocated to the elderly grows in Mexico in response to the
aging of the population, it becomes relevant to evaluate the effects of old-age support programs on
the behavior of the elderly and their families.
My results show that the transfer from the program has an effect on the time use of non-elderly
household members who live with eligible individuals, even though they are not directly targeted by
the program, and that this effect varies with the gender of the potential recipient. Prime-age women
reduce both their housework and market work time sign￿cantly, but only if they live with a age-
qualifying woman in a poor neighborhood in DF after the program started. In contrast, the program
seems to have no signi￿cant effect on the time use of prime-age men, regardless of the gender of the
potential recipient they live with. Simple calculations of the earnings foregone by prime-age women
who live with a woman age 70 or older show that at least 76% of the transfer from the program is
being shared with them. The decrease in labor earnings for prime age-women in such households
17could mitigate the effect of the program on total household income and the loss of labor market
experience for these women could be translated into lower earnings in the future.
Individuals 60 to 69 years old, who expect to receive the program in a few years, do not
change their time use unless they actually live with a potential bene￿ciary. This suggests that for the
￿rst years of operation of the program the expectation of receiving the program has not changed the
labor market behavior of individuals who are close to receiving the program. However, women 60 to
69 years old living with a potential bene￿ciary in DF and comparable men in poor neighborhoods in
DF signi￿cantly reduce their labor market participation and hours, which is a result that con￿icts with
the efforts made on other grounds to increase the labor supply of people in their 60s. My results show
that eligible individuals change their time use only if they live with an additional person who quali￿es
for the program. However, the effect of the program on the leisure time of qualifying individuals is
not signi￿cant, probably because they are already consuming more leisure than other age groups.
References
[1] Baker, M. and Benjamin, D., 1999, "How Do Retirement Tests Affect the Labor Supply of Older
Men?", Journal of Public Economics, 71, No. 1, January, pp. 27-51
[2] Bertrand, M.,Du￿o, E. and Mullainathan, S., 2004, "How Much Should We Trust Differences-
in-Differences Estimates?" Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119(1), pp. 249-275.
[3] Bertrand, M., Mullainathan, S. and Miller, D., 2003, "Public Policy and Extended Families:
Evidence from Pensions in South Africa," World Bank Economic Review, vol. 17(1), pages
27-50, June.
18[4] Case, A. and Deaton, A., 1998, "Large Cash Transfers to the Elderly in South Africa", Economic
Journal, vol. 108, No. 450, pp. 1330-1361.
[5] Disney, R. and Tanner, S., 2000, "The Abolition of the Earnings Rule for UK Pensioners," IFS
Working Papers, no.WP 00/13. The Institute for Fiscal Studies, London, UK.
[6] Friedberg, L., 2000, "The Labor Supply Effects of the Social Security Earnings Test," Review
of Economics and Statistics, 82, No. 1, February, pp. 48-63.
[7] Gruber, J. and Orszag, P., 2003, "Does the Social Security Earnings Test Affect Labor Supply
and Bene￿ts Receipt?", National Tax Journal, Vol. LVI, No. 4, December, pp. 755-773.
[8] Gruber, J. And Wise, D., 2005, "Social Security Programs and Retirement Around the World:
Fiscal Implications, Introduction and Summary," NBER Working Paper No. 11290.
[9] Hurd, M., 1997, "The Economics of Individual Aging", in Handbook of Population and Family
Economics, Vol. I, Part 2, North-Holland, pp. 891-966.
[10] Jensen, R., 2003, ￿Do Private Transfers ‘Displace’ the Bene￿ts of Public Transfers? Evidence
from South Africa.￿ Journal of Public Economics, 88(1-2), pp. 89-112.
[11] Leonesio, M., 1990, "The Effects of the Social Security Earnings Test on the Labor Activity
of Older Americans: A Review of the Evidence," Social Security Bulletin, 53, No. 5, May, pp.
2-21.
[12] Mof￿tt, R., 2002. "Welfare programs and labor supply," Handbook of Public Economics, edition
1, vol. 4, chapter 34, pp. 2393-2430, Elsevier.
19Table 1: Means of Individual and Household Characteristics  
Before the Program by State of Residence 
 
        
  Households with at 
least one person 70+ 
  Households with  




Mexico Difference DF 
State of 
Mexico Difference 
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Female 0.587  0.561  0.026 
(0.164) 
0.524 0.510  0.014*** 
(0.005) 
Head 0.332  0.300  0.032** 
(0.015) 
0.333 0.324  0.008* 
(0.004) 
Married 0.423  0.476  -0.054*** 
(0.017) 
0.574 0.583  -0.001* 
(0.005) 
Number of individuals  2522  1415    18167  17141   
            
            
HOUSEHOLDS            
            


































































0 0  0 






0 0  0 






0 0  0 
Female head  0.392  0.298  0.094*** 
(0.028) 
0.209 0.170  0.039*** 
(0.007) 
Poor 0.378  0.683  -0.305*** 
(0.028) 
0.532 0.722  -0.191*** 
(0.009) 
Number of households  841  8537    6123  5619   
            
Standard errors are in parentheses. Sample: Households and individuals in the metropolitan area of 
Mexico City in 2000, before the start of the program. The program targets households with at least one 
individual at least 70 years old in Distrito Federal (DF). Households with no members age 70 or older in 
DF and households in State of Mexico do not qualify for the program.  
* Significant at 10% 
** Significant at 5%  
*** Significant at 1% Table 2: Participation and Mean Weekly Hours in Different Activities by Age 
 
         
   Women      Men 
 18-59  60-69  70+   18-59  60-69  70+ 
Housework 
participation 















Work participation  0.42 0.18 0.07    0.82 0.53  0.23 





























observations  88442 7258  6227    79387 5925  4123 
              
Standard errors are in parentheses. Sample: Households and individuals in the metropolitan area of 
Mexico City in the period 2000-2004. The survey asks for the hours devoted the previous week to 
housework and market work. Housework includes time devoted to child and elderly care. Market work 
includes any time devoted to salaried work, self-employment or unpaid work in a family business. 
Leisure time is total weekly hours (168) minus the reported hours devoted to housework and market 
work. Housework Housework Work Work Leisure Housework Housework Work Work Leisure
Dummy Hours Dummy Hours Dummy Hours Dummy Hours
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Individual 70+ in HH x DF 
x After Year
2001 -0.001 1.706 -0.057 -6.496 2.415 -0.330*** -3.263*** 0.020 2.144 -1.112
(0.020) (4.166) (0.126) (6.884) (5.156) (0.110) (1.310) (0.104) (7.290) (5.252)
2002 0.012** 3.391 0.166 -2.189 -4.846 -0.144 -5.819* -0.237 1.901 -0.773
(0.005) (4.433) (0.172) (8.150) (7.736) (0.191) (3.405) (0.233) (6.681) (7.105)
2003 -0.963*** -1.273 0.042 -6.127 8.440 -0.089 -2.324 0.102* 11.582 -11.291** 
(0.034) (4.678) (0.196) (7.960) (6.110) (0.166) (2.232) (0.055) 7.607 (5.673)
Woman 70+ in HH x DF x 
After Year
2001 0.001 0.498 0.044 3.354 -3.536 0.236** 2.631 -0.002 -2.581 5.805
(0.022) (5.340) (0.163) (7.600) (6.573) (0.060) (1.820) (0.138) (8.972) (6.407)
2002 -0.037 -2.191 -0.138 -1.195 4.157 0.186 7.469* 0.093 -2.513 1.838
(0.089) (5.698) (0.193) (8.909) (8.374) (0.121) (3.911) (0.081) (9.182) (8.507)
2003 0.015*** 2.508 -0.009 6.145 -15.532*  0.139 4.315* -0.089 -4.192 4.366
(0.001) (6.002) (0.237) (9.041) (8.163) (0.135) (2.609) (0.207) (10.566) (8.442)
Poor x Individual 70+ in 
HH x DF x After Year
2001 0.016*** -4.728 0.183 11.373 -6.560 0.211*  1.756 0.056 10.241 -6.217
(0.001) (4.898) (0.181) (8.073) (6.420) (0.076) (1.854) (0.102) (9.037) (6.991)
2002 0.015*** -8.276 0.135 13.913 -1.622 0.071 4.127 0.137*** 5.233 -1.504
(0.001) 5.629 (0.236) (9.573) (9.057) (0.173) (3.673) (0.029) (8.038) (8.125)
2003 0.015*** -5.563 0.192 18.777** -13.961*  0.131 1.751 -0.190 -9.547 10.838
(0.001) (5.758) (0.249) (9.445) (8.186) (0.148) (2.831) (0.217) (9.035) (7.491)
Poor x Woman 70+ in HH 
x DF x After Year
2001 -0.986*** 0.561 -0.172 -7.745** 11.004 -0.258 0.875 -0.252 -12.799 1.332
(0.003) (6.427) (0.189) (3.901) (8.538) (0.182) (2.471) (0.290) (10.863) (8.270)
2002 -0.984*** 9.481 -0.137 -7.582* 2.634 -0.211 -3.788 -0.448 -8.621 0.429
(0.009) (7.436) (0.249) (3.980) (10.294) (0.251) (4.323) (0.326) (11.113) (10.134)
2003 -0.987*** 5.392 -0.221 -10.643***  22.136**  -0.222 -2.686 0.043 0.520 -3.900
(0.001) (7.426) (0.228) (3.950) (10.333) (0.254) 3.421 (0.149) (12.422) (10.599)
* Significant at 10%
** Significant at 5%
*** Significant at 1%
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the neighborhood level. Sample: Individuals 18 to 59 years old living in the metropoliltan area of Mexico 
City. The estimations were carried out separately for men (N=79,387) and women (N=88,442). Columns 1, 3, 6 and 7 report the marginal effects from a 
Probit for the probability that individual hours devoted to each activity are positive during the previous week. All other columns report OLS coefficients 
for the weekly hours devoted to each activity.All estimations control for age, years of education, dummies for DF resident, year dummies, a dummy for 
married, poor, for having an individual age 70 or older in the household, for having a woman 70 or older in the household and all the relevant double 
and triple interactions.
Table 3: The Effect of the Demogrant for the Elderly on the Time Use of Individuals 18 to 59 Years Old
Women MenHousework Housework Work Work Leisure Housework Housework Work Work Leisure
Dummy Hours Dummy Hours Dummy Hours Dummy Hours
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
DF x After Year
2001 0.021 2.148 -0.059 -3.254 1.022 -0.019 0.415 -0.001 1.965 -2.101
(0.049) (3.391) (0.125) (4.030) (3. 034) (0.033) (1.445) (0.082) (3.596) (3.133)
2002 0.008 0.398 -0.002 -0.983 0.243 0.032 2.245* -0.062 -0.557 -1.35
(0.063) (3.923) (0.154) (5.276) (3.501) (0.026) (1.363) (0.088) (4.766) (4.095)
2003 -0.032 -1.054 0.015 0.625 0.183 0.016 2.983* -0.057 -1.368 -1.249
(0.087) (3.740) (0.162) (5.679) (4.286) (0.031) (1.673) (0.094) (4.923) (4.026)
Individual 70+ in HH x DF x 
After Year
2001 0.040*** 9.838 0.13 9.342 -18.457 -0.096 -6.864 0.045 -4.197 10.168
(0.002) (6.473) (0.417) (14.972) (14.045) (0.204) (5.007) (0.269) (12.503) (12.316)
2002 0.081*** 19.145**  -0.298***  -18.271 -0.306 -0.951***  -14.803***  0.525** 18.045 -3.645
(0.006) (6.267) (0.076) (17.364) (16.890) (0.004) 4.816 (0.268) (15.031) (13.406)
2003 0.079*** 17.683**  -0.346***  -25.703 9.69 -0.948***  -13.200***  0.726***  23.922* -12.409
(0.005) 7.822 (0.009) (16.313) (14.732) (0.004) (5.301) (0.008) (13.552) (12.059)
Poor x DF x After Year
2001 0.025 0.880 0.093 2.275 -3.048 0.015 0.523 0.008 0.437 -1.203
(0.052) (3.927) (0.174) (5.623) (4.648) (0.030) (1.813) (0.103) (5.038) (4.512)
2002 0.007 4.183 0.04 1.608 -5.224 -0.034 -1.621 0.058 0.368 0.681
(0.077) (4.715) (0.200) (7.197) (5.595) (0.054) (1.797) (0.127) (6.208) (5.480)
2003 0.043 5.019 -0.142 -5.835 0.96 0.011 -1.234 0.143 3.261 -2.413
(0.040) (4.499) (0.138) (7.111) (5.967) (0.038) (2.144) (0.137) (6.296) (5.526)
Poor x Individual 70+ in HH x 
DF x After Year
2001 -0.109*** -9.056 0.097 16.140 -7.733 0.055 12.587 -0.288***  -28.239 16.42
(0.004) (8.867) (0.534) (20.824) (19.668) (0.037) (6.500) (0.078) (18.497) (17.589)
2002 -0.943*** -20.390*** 0.685*** 56.118**  -36.355 0.073***  22.834** -0.320***  -58.215***  35.884* 
(0.004) (9.347) (0.047) (24.428) (23.170) (0.005) (7.097) (0.009) (21.922) (19.976)
2003 -0.940*** -21.953*** 0.707*** 62.078** -41.834*  0.073***  20.508** -0.332***  -53.172**  34.207
(0.004) 10.988 (0.007) (25.403) (23.378) (0.005) 7.679 (0.007) 22.955 (22.076)
* Significant at 10%
** Significant at 5%
*** Significant at 1%
Table 4: The Effect of the Demogrant for the Elderly on the Time Use of Individuals 60 to 69 Years Old
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the neighborhood level. Sample: Individuals 60 to 69 years old living in the metropoliltan area of Mexico City. 
The estimations were carried out separately for men (N=5,925) and women (N=7,258). Columns 1, 3, 6 and 7 report the marginal effects from a Probit for the 
probability that individual hours devoted to each activity are positive during the previous week. All other columns report OLS coefficients for the weekly hours 
devoted to each activity.All estimations control for age, years of education, dummies for DF resident, year dummies, a dummy for married, poor, for having an 
individual age 70 or older in the household, and all the relevant double and triple interactions.
Women MenHousework Housework Work Work Leisure Housework Housework Work Work Leisure
Dummy Hours Dummy Hours Dummy Hours Dummy Hours
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
DF x After Year
2001 -0.004 -4.838** 0.011 1.237 3.575 -0.039 -1.212 -0.018 -1.968 2.978
(0.029) (2.317) (0.037) (1.792) (2.988) (0.120) (1.479) (0.132) 4.413 (4.220)
2002 0.029 -3.476 0.09 3.075 0.379 -0.009 0.045 -0.056 -3.779 3.862
(0.032) (3.113) (0.105) (2.590) (3.328) (0.134) (2.313) (0.120) (4.845) (4.738)
2003 -0.024 -4.495* 0.028 2.071 2.275 0.092 0.095 -0.040 -4.722 4.433
(0.052) (2.560) (0.073) (2.265) (3.318) (0.106) (2.100) (0.106) (4.577) (4.370)
Another individual 70+ in HH x 
DF x After Year
2001 -0.195 3.639 -0.093*** -3.311 -0.48 -0.149 1.258 0.225 5.538 -0.489
(0.227) (6.417) (0.017) (2.047) (6.432) (0.173) (2.675) (0.242) (6.662) (5.760)
2002 -0.960*** 6.476 -0.076***  -6.611**  0.014 -0.317 0.362 0.208 4.825 -1.708
(0.005) (5.461) (0.011) (2.712) (5.783) (0.236) (3.302) (0.229) (7.407) (6.880)
2003 -0.959*** 7.152 -0.078***  -8.753 1.718 -0.06 3.959 0.034 1.417 -8.043
(0.003) (5.958) (0.010) (5.490) (7.589) (0.187) (3.882) (0.200) (7.759) (6.731)
Poor x DF x After Year
2001 0.031 5.488* -0.008 .039 -5.49 0.007 1.503 -0.002 -0.734 -6.756
(0.033) (3.076) (0.041) (2.256) (3.903) (0.135) (2.151) (0.152) (6.002) (7.101)
2002 -0.036 6.489* -0.043** -4.132 -2.622 0.008 -.155*  0.064 1.813 -5.372
(0.076) (3.822) (0.017) (2.780) (4.328) (0.150) (2.919) (0.185) (7.028) (7.492)
2003 0.038 5.727 -0.035 -2.304 -3.359 -0.108 1.311 0.087 7.060 -5.257
(0.032) (3.558) (0.026) (2.858) (4.411) (0.180) (3.024) (0.177) (6.937) (7.738)
Poor x Another individual 70+ 
in HH x DF x After Year
2001 -0.950*** -10.305** 0.965***  2.630 7.807 0.151 -2.796**  -0.153 -0.378 3.042
(0.004) (7.499) (0.006) (4.710) (8.353) (0.115) (4.398) (0.109) (10.433) (10.540)
2002 -0.093 -14.280** 0.963***  4.697 9.783 0.095 -2.094** -0.193***  -7.438 9.749
(0.203) (7.304) (0.005) (5.968) (9.118) (0.174) (4.944) (0.059) (12.661) (12.921)
2003 -0.291 -16.218*** 0.967***  12.401* 3.778 0.049 -3.359***  0.051 4.826 -2.053
(0.348) (7.488) (0.004) (6.846) (9.376) (0.197) (5.159) (0.285) (12.060) (11.714)
* Significant at 10%
** Significant at 5%
*** Significant at 1%
Women Men
Table 5: The Effect of the Demogrant on the Time Use of Potential Beneficiaries (70+)
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the neighborhood level. Sample: Individuals at least 70 years old living in the metropoliltan area of Mexico City. 
The estimations were carried out separately for men (N=4,123) and women (N=6,227). Columns 1, 3, 6 and 7 report the marginal effects from a Probit for the 
probability that individual hours devoted to each activity are positive during the previous week. All other columns report OLS coefficients for the weekly hours 
devoted to each activity.All estimations control for age, years of education, dummies for DF resident, year dummies, a dummy for married, poor, for having another 
individual age 70 or older in the household and all the relevant double and triple interactions.Figure 1 
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